File:The 1973 Arab-Israeli war - the albatross of decisive victory (IA 1973arabisraeliw00geor).pdf

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The 1973 Arab-Israeli war : the albatross of decisive victory   (Wikidata search (Cirrus search) Wikidata query (SPARQL)  Create new Wikidata item based on this file)
Author
Gawrych, George W. (George Walter), 1950-
image of artwork listed in title parameter on this page
Title
The 1973 Arab-Israeli war : the albatross of decisive victory
Publisher
Fort Leavenworth, Kan. : Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Description
Includes bibliographical references (p. 91-97)
Illustrations -- Text -- Notes -- Bibliography
Armies appear to learn more from defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967. This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt's president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain strategic success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance. The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done
One copy presented by Robert L. Goldich

Subjects: Israel-Arab War, 1973
Language English
Publication date 1996
publication_date QS:P577,+1996-00-00T00:00:00Z/9
Current location
IA Collections: libraryofthemarinecorps; fedlink; americana
Accession number
1973arabisraeliw00geor
Authority file  OCLC: 1037396081
Source
Internet Archive identifier: 1973arabisraeliw00geor
https://archive.org/download/1973arabisraeliw00geor/1973arabisraeliw00geor.pdf

Licensing

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Public domain
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part of that person’s official duties under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code. Note: This only applies to original works of the Federal Government and not to the work of any individual U.S. state, territory, commonwealth, county, municipality, or any other subdivision. This template also does not apply to postage stamp designs published by the United States Postal Service since 1978. (See § 313.6(C)(1) of Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices). It also does not apply to certain US coins; see The US Mint Terms of Use.

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current08:24, 12 July 2020Thumbnail for version as of 08:24, 12 July 20201,033 × 1,431, 110 pages (6.31 MB) (talk | contribs)FEDLINK - United States Federal Collection 1973arabisraeliw00geor (User talk:Fæ/IA books#Fork8) (batch 1993-2020 #8)

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