File:THE EFFECT OF DECLINING OIL PRICES ON POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN VENEZUELA (IA theeffectofdecli1094562257).pdf

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THE EFFECT OF DECLINING OIL PRICES ON POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN VENEZUELA   (Wikidata search (Cirrus search) Wikidata query (SPARQL)  Create new Wikidata item based on this file)
Author
Hepp, Simon J.
image of artwork listed in title parameter on this page
Title
THE EFFECT OF DECLINING OIL PRICES ON POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN VENEZUELA
Publisher
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
Description

Mired in turmoil, the current state of Venezuelan politics is rife with political corruption and abuses of power. This thesis uses resource curse theory and governance datasets to analytically study changes in Venezuela over time to identify how the 2014 petroleum market crash affected the instances of political corruption. The argument shows that, when petroleum rents plummeted, financial and political incentives caused the focus of the Venezuelan government’s corruption behaviors to change from controlling the economy’s profits to regime survival. The governance data used reveals that in the period surrounding the 2014 petroleum market price decline, incentives behind political corruption shifted from cashing in on oil profits to consolidating political power, which affected the types of corruption actions used by government officials. The findings in this thesis demonstrate that governments without institutional constraints are likely to use different kinds of politically corrupt activities to stay in power during periods of decreased petroleum rent than they do when experiencing windfall incomes. The lack of institutional constraint in Venezuela caused by the willful abuse of power, as well as insufficient government capacity, signals that hurried efforts to rebuild Venezuela must emphasize the quality of governance and the policing of corruption before focusing on repairing the economy.


Subjects: rentier state; petropolitics; resource curse; Dutch disease; political corruption; Venezuela; petroleum; Maduro; Chávez; petroleum rent; South America; Latin America; socialism
Language English
Publication date March 2019
Current location
IA Collections: navalpostgraduateschoollibrary; fedlink
Accession number
theeffectofdecli1094562257
Source
Internet Archive identifier: theeffectofdecli1094562257
https://archive.org/download/theeffectofdecli1094562257/theeffectofdecli1094562257.pdf
Permission
(Reusing this file)
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.

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Public domain
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part of that person’s official duties under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code. Note: This only applies to original works of the Federal Government and not to the work of any individual U.S. state, territory, commonwealth, county, municipality, or any other subdivision. This template also does not apply to postage stamp designs published by the United States Postal Service since 1978. (See § 313.6(C)(1) of Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices). It also does not apply to certain US coins; see The US Mint Terms of Use.

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current05:14, 25 July 2020Thumbnail for version as of 05:14, 25 July 20201,275 × 1,650, 114 pages (1.19 MB) (talk | contribs)FEDLINK - United States Federal Collection theeffectofdecli1094562257 (User talk:Fæ/IA books#Fork8) (batch 1993-2020 #29397)

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