File:Greed-and-Fear-in-Network-Reciprocity-Implications-for-Cooperation-among-Organizations-pone.0147264.s007.ogv
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[edit]DescriptionGreed-and-Fear-in-Network-Reciprocity-Implications-for-Cooperation-among-Organizations-pone.0147264.s007.ogv |
English: Greed intervention within the consolidation region, falling from Greed = 6.0 to Greed = 4.0, with Fear = 4.0 and 90% initial cooperators. The first part of this video illustrates a typical evolution of cooperation within the high-Greed end of the consolidation region, with parameters identical to the second half of S6 Video. After the model reaches equilibrium with cooperators (blue) settled into a few stable enclaves surrounded by defectors (red), an exogenous intervention decreases Greed from 6.0 to 4.0, returning to the same Greed value as the start of S6 Video. Although payoffs cross the same boundary in reverse, the system-level cooperation does not rise to the top of the step, but maintains the low level of cooperation. This illustrates the asymmetry in Greed interventions, which makes Greed boundaries one-way downward in the high range of Greed. Here (e.g. the boundaries at Greed = 8.0 and Greed = 4.8), allowing Greed to cross above the boundary destroys cooperator clusters and moving back below the boundary cannot revive those clusters. |
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Source | S7 Video from Kitts J, Leal D, Felps W, Jones T, Berman S (2016). "Greed and Fear in Network Reciprocity: Implications for Cooperation among Organizations". PLOS ONE. DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0147264. PMID 26863540. PMC: 4749156. | ||
Author | Kitts J, Leal D, Felps W, Jones T, Berman S | ||
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This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license.
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Date/Time | Thumbnail | Dimensions | User | Comment | |
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current | 08:10, 29 February 2016 | 8.0 s, 1,120 × 525 (209 KB) | Open Access Media Importer Bot (talk | contribs) | Automatically uploaded media file from Open Access source. Please report problems or suggestions here. |
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Short title | Greed intervention within the consolidation region, falling from Greed |
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Author | Kitts J, Leal D, Felps W, Jones T, Berman S |
Usage terms | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
Image title | The first part of this video illustrates a typical evolution of cooperation within the high-Greed end of the consolidation region, with parameters identical to the second half of S6 Video. After the model reaches equilibrium with cooperators (blue) settled into a few stable enclaves surrounded by defectors (red), an exogenous intervention decreases Greed from 6.0 to 4.0, returning to the same Greed value as the start of S6 Video. Although payoffs cross the same boundary in reverse, the system-level cooperation does not rise to the top of the step, but maintains the low level of cooperation. This illustrates the asymmetry in Greed interventions, which makes Greed boundaries one-way downward in the high range of Greed. Here (e.g. the boundaries at Greed |
Software used | Xiph.Org libtheora 1.1 20090822 (Thusnelda) |
Date and time of digitizing | 2016-02-10 |