File:The influence of sea power upon history, 1660-1783 (1890) (14783376632).jpg

Identifier: seanpowerinf00maha (find matches)
Title: The influence of sea power upon history, 1660-1783
Year: 1890 (1890s)
Authors: Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer), 1840-1914
Subjects: Naval history Sea-power
Publisher: Boston : Little, Brown and Company
Contributing Library: University of California Libraries
Digitizing Sponsor: Internet Archive

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t-ern ships were so placed that vessels approaching from thesouthward could reach them with the usual wind. Hood, therefore, w^e arc told, intended to appear at earlydaylight, in order of and ready for battle, and fall uponthe eastern ships, filing by them with his whole fleet (a, a),thus concentrating the fire of all upon a few of the enemy ;then turning away, so as to escape the guns of the others,he proposed, first wearing and then tacking, to keep hisfleet circling in long procession (a, a) past that part of theenemys ships chosen for attack. The plan was audacious,but undeniably sound in principle ; some good could hardlyfail to follow, and unless De Grasse showed more readinessthan he had hitherto done, even decisive results might behoped for.i 1 The curve, a, a, a, represents the line which Hood proposed to follow withhis fleet, the wind being supposed east-southeast. The positions B, B, B, referto the proceedings of a subsequent day and have nothing to do with the diagramat A.
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AT ST. CHRISTOPHER. 471 The best-laid plans, however, may fail, and Hoods wasbalked by the awkwardness of a lieutenant of the watch,who hove-to (stopped) a frigate at night ahead of the fleet,and was consequently run down by a ship-of-the-line. Thelatter also received such injury as delayed the movement,several hours being lost in repairing damages. The Frenchwere thus warned of the enemys approach, and althoughnot suspecting his intention to attack, De Grasse fearedthat Hood would pass down to leeward of him and disturbthe siege of Brimstone Hill, — an undertaking so rash foran inferior force that it is as difficult to conceive how hecould have supposed it, as to account for his overlookingthe weakness of his own position at anchor. At one P.M. of the 24th the English fleet was seen roundingthe south end of Nevis ; at three De Grasse got under way andstood to the southward. Toward sundown Hood also wentabout and stood south, as though retreating; but he waswell to windward of his o

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