File:Paul Wolfowitz, David Jeremiah, Robert Kimmitt, Richard Kerr, Robert Gates, and Lloyd Salvetti.gif

English: Panelists (left to right): Paul Wolfowitz, David Jeremiah, Robert Kimmitt, Richard Kerr, Robert Gates, and Lloyd Salvetti.

On Providing Intelligence to Policymakers CSI Director Lloyd Salvetti, in introducing the panelists, noted that they constituted, in effect, a re-creation of the Bush Administration’s Deputies Committee. The panel consisted entirely of former members of that Committee, which was chaired by the deputy national security adviser (Dr. Gates held the post from 1989-1991). Other members included the number-two or number-three officials of four major entities—the State and Defense Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA. Additional departments and agencies participated if topics on the agenda required their presence.

The panelists identified a variety of factors—including those related to intelligence—that made the Deputies Committee a critical forum in national security decisionmaking during President Bush’s tenure. Dr. Gates noted, for example, that the panel consisted of people who respected, trusted, and could speak frankly with one another, and who approached the Committee’s work in a collegial spirit. These were very senior people who could commit their department or agency and its leader, had the trust of and easy access to that leader, and could, in Dr. Gates’s words, "strip away all of the bureaucratic baloney and get down to what was the really key issue" that the Committee and/or the President had to decide.

Panel Chair Salvetti observed that prior service in a variety of important policy posts was a thread connecting those who served on the Deputies Committee, a point alluded to by Robert Kimmitt, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in the Bush Administration, who represented the State Department on the Committee. Under Secretary Kimmitt noted that several Committee members had previously served at the assistant secretary level. Dr. Gates suggested that any new President, in assembling a national security team, should put a premium on bringing together people who have known each other and worked together at one time or another. Under Secretary Kimmitt endorsed this view, observing that intelligence often plays an especially important role in policy formulation early in an Administration, "where you have at most about a six-month window to put in place an effective policy foundation before events start to run away from you."