File:BR, Vietnam, 1972, Easter Counter-Offensive, file 029.jpg

At the beginning: "Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., CinCPac, cancelled Exercise Golden Dragon on 3 April, and III MAF's commander, Lieutenant General Loluis Metzger, ordered General Miller and the 9th MAB staff to remain on the USS Blue Ridge for combat or evacuation operations. ... Latter it was learned that General Cao Van Vien of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff and General Abrams ... had not sent or approved the initial calls for assistance to the Seventh Fleet ... the forward deployment of amphibious forces to holding areas off the DMZ, ... Seventh Fleet was saturated with message traffic at this point ... The 9th MAB had various contingency plans ... the amphibious brigade turned its attention from potentially conducting emergency evacuations to building up its forces. ... " "... some of the functions performed by the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade during the period ... normally are not assigned to the landing force; ... The Marine Corps position is that landing force assets will not be assigned to perform these functions except in an emergency ..." "the uncertainty of the military situation in MR I made the evacuation of Americans from the region the most probable mission. ... After his reconnaissance ... defenses ashore were virtually nonexistent and that a successful evacuation under enemy attack was doubtful. ... " [23]

Dreaming: "American planners had long considered the possi-bility of an amphibious landing at Vinh to cut the Vietnamese panhandle north of the DMZ. The Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, had present-ed such a landing as a planning exercise to students in the past. ... suggesting this option to General William C. Westmoreland in 1965 while Jones was a brigadier general ... Seventh Fleet conducted feints north of the DMZ in 1968 and 1971. The availability of the U.S. forces and the vulnerabilities of the North Vietnamese to this course of action were never greater than in the spring of 1972 ... A Central Intelligence Agency analyst on Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker's staff in Saigon, Edwin W. Besch, observed that an amphibious landing in North Vietnam to rear of NVA forces would have had a greater operational effect than the tactical landings conducted in South Vietnam. ... Early on, Seventh Fleet's Admiral Mack proposed an amphibious assault directly at the North Vietnamese mainland, or at least a feint or demonstration. ... arriving in the Tonkin Gulf, Admiral Gaddis issued an order for a Task Force 76 demonstration against the Dong Hoi-Quang Khe areas. Admiral McCain, CinCPac, them directed a demonstration just south of the DMZ. ... General Kroesen objected ... both operations were canceled prior to a proposed D-Day of 24 April 1972 By late April, planning ... Prompted by the need to relieve pressure on South Vietnamese forces in MR 1 ... to land Marines by surface and air assault on several points in North Vietnam. ... there "was scarcely a single square-inch of the North Vietnamese coastal littoral of any value whatsoever which was not the subject of at least one plan." ... Courses of action included ... Dong Hoi ... Quang Khe ... Hon Mat ... Vinh ... " [24]

Dreaming and politics: "Admiral Mack again moved north ... Operation Heroic Action, a raid to seize the Dong Hoi ferry crossings south of Vinh. General Miller said the purpose was "to go into North Vietnam and a whole bunch of other things." ... communication exercises began on 11 May off Dong Hoi. On 13 May, Admiral thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, postponed the operation indefinitely, ... Admiral McCain, CinCPac, then ordered a demonstration for the next day, ... A 9th MAB message to General Metzger described Heroic Action as a turnaway landing. General Jones, then FMFPac, remembered the raid "as a fact," ... Records from Seventh Fleet and Fleet Marine Force Pacific indicated it was to be a raid, while records from the Pacific Command and JCS stated for political reasons it was never more than a deception plan. ... The plan for an amphibious assault on Haiphong in early May, the port for Hanoi, was rejected in D.C. with a vigorous "No". After which, a very senior member of staff leaves the IOIC briefing room, clutching his butt and exclaiming, "this is why the Navy has REAR admirals"... General Miller observed that, " political constraints precluded the reintroduction of U.S. Marine Corps troops into South Vietnam in a land warfare role." ... Seventh Fleet amphibious forces were now totally com-mitted to the support of American and Vietnamese units in South Vietnam. ... " [25]